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Abstract
Cities located in regions prone to natural hazards such as ooding
are not uniformly exposed to risks because of sub-city local charac-
teristics (e.g. topography). Spatial heterogeneity thus raises the issue
of how these cities have spread and should continue to develop. The
current paper investigates these questions by using an urban model
in which each location is characterized by a transport cost to the city
center and a risk exposure. Riskier areas are developed nearer to the
city center than further away. Investment in building resilience leads
to more compact cities. At a given distance to the city center, riskier
areas have lower land prices and get lower household density and higher
building resilience. Actuarially fair insurance generates optimal den-
sity and resilience. An increase of insurance subsidization leads to an
increase of density in the riskiest areas and a general decrease of re-
silience. In this case density restrictions and building codes have to be
enforced to limit risk over-exposure.
Keywords: urbanization, natural disaster risks, insurance, resilience.
JEL classication: R52, Q54, O18, G22, H23.
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1 Introduction
In October 2012, hurricane Sandy hit the East Coast of the USA, killing 54
people and generating more than 50 billion dollars of losses.1 The damage
was tremendous in Greater New York: 17% of the city was ooded and
150,000 homes were damaged (The Economist, 2012, 2013). Insurance in-
demnities were paid to aected households that were insured, and relief had
to be organized for those that were not covered. People whose houses were
destroyed wondered if they should abandon or rebuild them, and if so, how
high they should elevate their new homes. Governments wondered if they
should authorize development in risky areas like Oakwood Beach on Staten
Island, and if so, according to which building codes. Sandy is only one
example of extreme meteorological events that have caused large ooding
damages in the world in the recent years. Among those, Xynthia superstorm
aected the European coast in February 2010, hurricane Katrina struck the
New Orleans region in the USA in August 2005 and Maharashtra heavy
rains ooded the area of Mumbai in India in July 2005. Each time, these
events and their devastating losses have raised the same questions about the
necessity of better managing urban development in areas prone to natural
hazards.
Most risk-prone regions were initially urbanized because of the many
advantages they oered to communities. In particular, many cities are lo-
cated near seas and/or rivers, as they can provide natural resources and
transport facilities. Nowadays, many industries and services rely on these
specicities, and agglomeration forces continue to drive urbanization at these
locations (Fujita & Thisse, 2002). However, these locations are often double-
edged because of exposure to ooding in the case of extreme meteorological
events. Natural hazards coupled with expanding urbanization have already
increased losses in the last few decades, and these are expected to escalate
with the rising sea level and more severe rainfall patterns due to climate
change (IPCC, 2014). At a sub-urban scale in risk-prone cities, locations
are dierentiated not only by their distance to valuable amenities such as
the city center but also by exposure to risk due to local characteristics (e.g.
topography for ooding risks). The sub-city spatial heterogeneity raises the
essential question of how these cities have spread until now and how they
should continue to develop in the future.
1http://www.emdat.be/
2
The paper investigates these issues by using an urban model in which
each location is characterized by a transport cost to the city center (or to
other valuable amenities) and a risk of natural hazard (such as ooding).
It focuses on the impacts of risk spatial variation and insurance subsidiza-
tion on city development.2 My results are the following. Riskier areas are
developed nearer to the city center than further away. Investment in build-
ing resilience leads to more compact cities. At a given distance to the city
center, riskier areas have lower land prices and get lower household den-
sity and higher building resilience. Actuarially fair insurance promotes the
optimal development of the city in terms of risk prevention, with optimal
household density and optimal building resilience. I analyze how an increase
of insurance subsidization aects the city development. If the subsidy is -
nanced by households in the city, it leads to an increase/decrease of density
in the riskiest/safest areas. If the subsidy is nanced by households in the
country, it leads to a general increase of density in the city because it at-
tracts households from other cities. Moreover, in any case, an increase of
insurance subsidization leads to a general decrease of building resilience in
the city. These results show that density and zoning restrictions as well as
building codes have to be enforced in the city to limit risk over-exposure
when insurance is subsidized.3
Academics in insurance economics have shown much interest in natural
disasters, in particular because of the numerous imperfections in natural dis-
aster insurance markets (Kunreuther, 1984; Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan,
2009). On the supply side (Charpentier & Le Maux, 2014; Jaee & Rus-
sell, 1997), diversication issues lead private insurers to supply contracts
at prices largely above actuarially fair rates. On the demand side (Botzen
et al., 2015; Kunreuther et al., 2007; Raschky & Weck-Hannemann, 2007),
households under-insure even if insurance is fair, in particular because they
under-estimate the risk or they expect free assistance (charity hazard). In
2In the present framework, households deliberately purchase full insurance because
they are risk-averse and insurance is supplied at or below actuarially fair prices. The
model does not consider charity hazard or risk perception bias. Note however that the
expectancy of assistance or the under-estimation of risk should have eects similar to
insurance subsidization on the city development in terms of risk over-exposure.
3Density restriction at one location consists in limiting urban density while zoning
restriction at one location consists in completely forbidding urban development. Building
codes consist in imposing a minimal level of building resilience.
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this context, policy makers have implemented natural disaster public poli-
cies such as the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the USA and
various programs in Europe like the CatNat in France (Bouwer et al., 2007;
Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, 2009). To deal with diversication issues,
public insurance/relief can complement the weak private insurance supply
(e.g. in the USA) or public reinsurance can help private insurance to supply
contracts at lower prices (e.g. in France). However, these policies can-
not solve the weak insurance demand issues without subsidizing insurance
or/and making it mandatory. For instance, the NFIP in the USA subsidizes
contracts in risky areas thanks to taxpayers, and insurance is requested for
access to loans. Meanwhile, the CatNat Program in France subsidizes con-
tracts in risky areas with the other contracts and insurance is mandatory
to avoid adverse selection. If the advantage of subsidization is to improve
insurance demand and risk sharing (Browne & Hoyt, 2000; Grace et al.,
2004), the disadvantage is to lead to risk over-exposure because it does not
provide the right incentives for individual risk prevention (Bagstad et al.,
2007; Courbage et al., 2013; Picard, 2008).
Academics in urban economics have focused on natural disaster issues in
the context of city development. As modeled rst by Alonso (1964), house-
holds spread out in the space surrounding the city center to commute there
for consumption or work, and those settled further away incurring higher
transport costs are compensated by lower land rent, which explains the in-
creasing housing lot sizes and the decreasing density with distance to the
city center. Polinsky & Shavell (1976) and Scawthorn et al. (1982) add in
their model the existence of a negative amenity such as exposure to natural
hazard. These models show that, at a given distance from the city center,
the land price decreases when the loss exposure increases. Many empirical
studies have conrmed this eect for natural disaster risks, as summarized in
the meta-analysis by Daniel et al. (2009). Because households do not want to
incur too much transport cost or natural disaster cost, Frame (1998) demon-
strates that riskier areas are developed nearer to the city center than further
away, and some risky areas inside the city outer boundary may stay undevel-
oped. The tradeo between transport cost and natural disaster cost has been
observed empirically for instance by Smith (1993) and Atreya & Czajkowski
(2014). Frame (1998) also points out that insurance subsidization decreases
the land price dierence between risky areas and safe areas, as conrmed
empirically by Shilling et al. (1989). Furthermore, Frame (2001) shows theo-
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retically that risk aversion can lead households to under-develop risky areas.
However, many empirical studies, such as Browne & Hoyt (2000), Harrison
et al. (2001) and Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012), suggest that households are
more inclined to risk over-exposure because of insurance subsidization, risk
under-estimation or charity hazard, than to risk under-exposure because of
risk aversion.4 In this case, urban regulation should be enforced to limit over-
exposure, in particular in terms of zoning/density restrictions and building
codes (Bagstad et al., 2007; Kunreuther, 1996; Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan,
2013). In an urban theoretical model with risk exposure but no transport
costs, Grislain-Letremy & Villeneuve (2014) show that zoning restrictions
can be Pareto improving in the case of full insurance subsidization. In em-
pirical analysis, Czajkowski & Simmons (2014) and McKenzie & Levendis
(2010) respectively observe that investments in building resilience reduce
natural disaster losses and increase housing values.
The present paper aims to further analyze the role of natural hazard
exposure and insurance subsidization in the development of risk-prone cities
with transport costs. Relative to the previously cited theoretical papers
on urban economics, the present paper adds building resilience modeling
and analyzes how densities and resiliences are aected by natural hazard
exposure and insurance subsidization. This analysis is essential from the
perspective of implementing ecient urban regulation, in terms of zoning
restrictions, density restrictions and building codes, for cities with transport
costs and natural disaster risks. The rest of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 provides an analysis of city
development. Section 4 provides an analysis of the impact of a change in
insurance subsidization. Section 5 concludes.
2 Risk-prone city model
I consider a static model of a city with commuting transport costs and natu-
ral hazard exposure, in the spirit of Frame (1998, 2001), Polinsky & Shavell
4Browne & Hoyt (2000) observe that households do not usually buy insurance at fair
prices, Harrison et al. (2001) notice that the housing rent dierence between risky and safe
areas is below the expected loss dierence and Michel-Kerjan et al. (2012) point out that
insured households let their insurance contract lapse after a few years even when those
are below fair prices. All this would not be possible if risk aversion was the dominating
factor.
5
(1976) and Scawthorn et al. (1982). The city is inhabited by N identical
households.5 The sub-city scale grid is modeled by a two-dimensional con-
tinuous space with the coordinate system x = (x1; x2). Because of spatial
heterogeneity due to transport costs and natural hazards, all variables po-
tentially depend on location x. Moreover, each variable has a unique value at
each location x because I consider identical households and identical housing
developers. The city has a pre-established center located at x = (0; 0), also
called the central business district where work and consumption activities
are concentrated.
Households compete to spread out in the space around the city center
and commute between their housing location and the city center. They
choose their housing location x and the quantity of goods purchased in the
city center, aggregated in a composite good denoted z(x). Besides composite
good consumption, households value their housing good consumption, char-
acterized by lot size, measured in land area unit and denoted s(x).6 The
utility function of each household, denoted v(:), depends on z(x) and s(x)
and is classically supposed to be twice continuously dierentiable, strictly
increasing in each argument (with @zv(0; s) = 1 and @sv(z; 0) = 1) and
globally concave. The composite good supplied in the city center is consid-
ered as the numeraire (i.e. price equal to 1 for one unit of good) and the
housing good supplied by housing developers at location x has a housing unit
price denoted ph(x) (i.e. price for one land area unit with housing). The
composite good expenses and the housing rent for one household located at
x are thus respectively z(x) and ph(x)s(x).
Besides composite good expenses and housing rent, households incur
commuting transport costs and expenses related to natural hazards. One
household settling at location x incurs the given transport cost t(x) because
of commuting between its housing location and the city center (or poten-
tially other valuable amenities). For example, a city located next to an
estuary is depicted in gure 1.7 On the land, the darkness of the square
5I consider identical households in order to analyze the average development of the
city. Inequality or asymmetric information issues are not the purpose of the analysis.
6The lot size for one household is the land area for this household. For example, for
a building occupying 400m2 of land and inhabited by 10 households, the lot size of one
household is 40m2.
7In gures 1 and 2, the space is represented by a discrete grid even if the model is
continuous.
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units characterizes the commuting transport cost t(x) for each household
located at x. Darker areas represent locations further from the city center
with higher transport costs. In stylized models, transport costs are often
considered to be proportional to the distance to the city center. However,
real transport costs are more complex than this stylized form, in particular
because of transport system complexity. Moreover, other potential ameni-
ties (e.g. the positive amenities of being near the water-front) should be
taken into account in the transport costs. Note also that transport costs
should include dierent costs, in particular the direct transport cost but
also the time opportunity cost.
One household settling at location x is also exposed to natural hazards
(such as ooding), with the given probability of impact (x). The level
of the loss in case of impact, denoted l(:), depends on the housing lot size
s(x) and on the building resilience, denoted b(x). The loss function l(:) is
assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable. It is decreasing with b at
a decreasing rate because the most ecient resilience investments are made
rst. Besides, if it is reasonably assumed that more households on a land
unit leads to more total losses on this land unit (for a given building resilience
level), the loss function is such that l(s;b)s  @l@s(s; b) for any s and b.8 Note
that losses should include direct and indirect losses. The city depicted in
gure 1 is also represented in gure 2 for natural hazard exposure. On the
land, the darkness of the square units characterizes the probability (x) of
being aected by a natural hazard for each household located at x. The
higher the risk, the darker the location. For ooding risks, locations at
lower altitude are usually more subject to ooding and should be darker.
The probability of being aected by a natural hazard can correspond for
example to the probability that the water level reaches a threshold level that
induces signicant losses for households. Besides, I consider that insurance
is supplied to households at or below fair prices because I do not consider
any insurance transaction cost and I consider potential insurance subsidy.
As households are risk-averse (i.e. their utility function is concave), they
deliberately purchase full insurance coverage and bear a certain cost related
8With 1
s
households on a developed land unit, each one having a lot size s, the total loss
on the land unit is 1
s
l(s; b). If more households on a land unit leads to more total losses
on this land unit, the loss function is such that l(s1;b)
s1
 l(s2;b)
s2
for any 1
s1
 1
s2
and b. In
this case, for any s and ds  0, l(s+ds;b)
s+ds
 l(s;b)
s
, which leads to s
 
l(s; b) + @l
@s
(s; b)ds
 
(s+ ds)l(s; b) and then @l
@s
(s; b)  l(s;b)
s
with a rst order development.
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to natural disaster risks, which is the insurance premium. With insurance
subsidy corresponding to a fraction  2 [0; 1] of expected losses, the premium
paid by a household located at x is (1   )(x)l(s(x); b(x)). The higher ,
the higher the subsidy. The insurance subsidy can be nanced either by
the city through a lump-sum tax on household wealth or by another party
outside the city. In the former case, the tax borne by each household in the
city is  = N
RR
(x)l
 
s(x); b(x)

n(x)dx1dx2 (in which n(x) is the household
density at location x). In the latter case, the tax borne by each household in
the city is  = 0.9 For one household located at x, transport cost, insurance
premium and tax are thus respectively t(x), (1  )(x)l(s(x); b(x)) and  .
x2
x1
sea and river
city center
increasing
transport cost
Figure 1: Commuting transport costs in the city.
As households are identical in terms of preferences and wealth, denoted
y, they reach the same utility level v at equilibrium. Otherwise, households
with lower utility levels at location x would have settled at location x0 where
other households reach a higher utility level, which would have decreased at
x and increased at x0 housing unit price until the equilibrium with spatially
uniform utility level had been reached. Following Alonso (1964) and Fujita
& Thisse (2002), competition between households over where to settle leads
9The latter case is representative of an insurance subsidized by the country which is
large relative to the city. Besides, note that a natural disaster like ooding usually strikes
many locations of a city at the same time and thus has an aggregate risk component at
the city level. However, an insurance system organized at the country level enables to
better diversify risk.
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x2
x1
sea and river
city center
increasing
natural hazard risk
Figure 2: Natural hazard risks in the city.
housing prices to be the solutions of bid price problems: at each location
x, the housing unit price ph(x) corresponds to the highest price that can
be aorded by households. The wealth minus expenses except housing rent,
divided by the lot size, is the maximal amount that can be paid by one
household for one land unit with housing. As households are free to choose
their composite good consumption and reach the utility level v, the housing
unit bid price problem at location x can then be expressed as follows:
ph(x) = max
z(x)
y      z(x)  t(x)  (1  )(x)l s(x); b(x)
s(x)
s:t: v
 
z(x); s(x)

= v:
(1)
Housing goods are supplied by identical housing developers in competi-
tion. Housing developers observe the housing unit price (1) resulting from
the competition between households. They compete to acquire land from
absentee land owners at the land unit price denoted pl(x) at each location
x (i.e. price for one land area unit without housing). They choose the hous-
ing lot size s(x) and the building resilience b(x) for urban development at
each location x. Besides the cost of land, they incur the cost of housing
lot development, denoted c(s(x); b(x)) for lot size s(x) and resilience b(x)
for one household. The cost function c(:) is assumed to be twice continu-
ously dierentiable. It is increasing with b at an increasing rate because the
less costly resilience investments are made rst. Besides, if it is reasonably
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assumed that more households on a land unit leads to more total housing
development costs on this land unit (for a given building resilience level),
the cost function is such that c(s;b)s  @c@s(s; b) for any s and b.10 At each
location, housing developers are constrained by the availability of one land
area unit. Similarly to the housing unit price, the land unit price pl(x) is
determined at each location x by the highest price that can be aorded by
housing developers because of competition. The housing rent per household
minus the development cost, multiplied by the household density denoted
n(x), is the maximal amount that can be paid by one housing developer for
one land area unit. As housing developers are free to choose housing lot
sizes and building resiliences, and they observe the housing unit price (1)
and face land constraints, the land unit bid price problem at location x can
then be expressed as follows:
pl(x) = max
s(x);b(x)

ph(x)s(x)  c
 
s(x); b(x)

n(x)
s:t: (1) and n(x)s(x)  1:
(2)
The boundaries of the city correspond to the locations where the land unit
price pl(x) is equal to the land opportunity rent denoted pa (e.g agricultural
rent).
Finally, the city is characterized by its number of households:
N =
ZZ
n(x)dx1dx2: (3)
With a given number of households (i.e. N given), (3) indirectly determines
the welfare level v in the city. This characterizes in particular a "closed
city" in terms of population. With a given welfare level (i.e. v given), (3)
determines the number of households N in the city. This characterizes in
particular an "open city" in which the welfare level depends on the welfare
level outside the city.
3 Risk-prone city development
Outside the boundaries of the city, housing development is not protable
(n(x) = 0 and pl(x) = pa). On the boundaries, land may be partly developed
(0  s(x)n(x)  1) because housing development is equally protable to
10The proof is similar to the one in the footnote 8 for the natural disaster loss function.
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agriculture (pl(x) = pa). Inside the boundaries, land is fully developed
because housing development is more protable than agriculture and thus
the household density is:
n(x) =
1
s(x)
: (4)
As explained in the previous section, households settled in the city reach
the same welfare level v at equilibrium. As the utility function v(:) is strictly
increasing in z, ~z(s; v) can be dened such that v(~z(s; v); s) = v and ~z(:)
is decreasing with s at a decreasing rate because v(:) is concave (proof in
appendix A.1). Thus, the composite good consumption z(x) purchased by
one household settled at location x can be expressed as a function of the
housing lot size s(x) and the uniform welfare level v:
z(x) = ~z
 
s(x); v

: (5)
With (5), the housing unit bid price problem (1) boils down to the housing
unit price:
ph(x) =
y      ~z s(x); v  t(x)  (1  )(x)l s(x); b(x)
s(x)
: (6)
With the housing unit price (6) and the household density (4), the land
unit bid price problem (2) boils down to:
pl(x) = max
s(x);b(x)
y      ~z
 
s(x); v

  t(x)  (1  )(x)l
 
s(x); b(x)

  c
 
s(x); b(x)

s(x)
:
(7)
The housing lot size s(x) and the building resilience b(x) chosen by housing
developers at location x inside the boundaries of the city are the solutions
of the rst order conditions of (7) (proof in appendix A.2):
@sv
@zv
 
s(x); ~z(s(x); v)

= (1  )(x) @l
@s
 
s(x); b(x)

+
@c
@s
 
s(x); b(x)

+ pl(x); (8)
 (1  )(x) @l
@b
 
s(x); b(x)

=
@c
@b
 
s(x); b(x)

: (9)
(8) states that the housing lot size s(x) for one household at location x is cho-
sen such that it equalizes the marginal rate of substitution to the marginal
housing unit cost (over the composite good price, i.e. the numeraire). The
marginal rate of substitution characterizes the marginal benet of increasing
the housing lot size for the household, which decreases from +1 to 0 when
s(x) increases from 0 to +1. The marginal housing unit cost is composed
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of the marginal insurance premium borne by the household, the marginal
housing development cost and the land unit price. (9) relates that the build-
ing resilience b(x) for housing at location x is chosen such that it equalizes
the marginal benet of decreasing insurance premium for the household to
the marginal cost of increasing building resilience for the housing developer.
Note that if  (1   )(x)@bl(s(x); 0)  @bc(s(x); 0), b(x) is binding in 0.
With s(x) and b(x) being determined by (8) and (9), (7) then indirectly
gives the land unit price:
pl(x) =
y      ~z
 
s(x); v

  t(x)  (1  )(x)l
 
s(x); b(x)

  c
 
s(x); b(x)

s(x)
: (10)
Proposition 1 With null cross derivation for l(:) and c(:) relative to their
two arguments, the housing lot size s(x) and the building resilience b(x) vary
in space as follows:11
A1(x)
ds
d
!
x
=
1
s(x)
dt
d
!
x
+ (1  )

l
 
s(x); b(x)

s(x)
  @l
@s
 
s(x); b(x)
 d
d
!
x
; (11)
A2(x)
db
d
!
x
=  (1  ) @l
@b
 
s(x); b(x)
 d
d
!
x
; (12)
in which A1(x) and A2(x) are positive.
Proposition 1 is proved in appendix A.3. (11) tells that, at a given risk of
natural hazard, the housing lot size s(x) increases while translating further
away from the city center. Thus, the household density n(x) (i.e. the inverse
of the housing lot size s(x)) decreases while translating further away from
the city center, as rst explained by Alonso (1964). With the reasonable
assumption l(s;b)s  @l@s(s; b) for any s and b, the coecient in front of dd!x in
(11) is positive and (11) says that, at a given distance to the city center,
the housing lot size s(x) increases while translating towards riskier areas
if insurance is not fully subsidized ( < 1). Thus, the household density
n(x) decreases while translating towards riskier areas in this case. As l(:) is
decreasing with b, (12) points out that the building resilience increases while
translating towards riskier areas if insurance is not fully subsidized ( < 1).
Proposition 2 The housing unit price ph(x) and the land unit price pl(x)
vary in space as follows:
dph
d
!
x
=
dpl
d
!
x
+
@c
@s (s(x); b(x))  c(s(x);b(x))s(x)
s(x)
ds
d
!
x
+
@c
@b (s(x); b(x))
s(x)
db
d
!
x
; (13)
11d
!
x corresponds to any small move in space: d
!
x = (dx1; dx2).
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dpl
d
!
x
=   1
s(x)
dt
d
!
x
  (1  )l(s(x); b(x))
s(x)
d
d
!
x
: (14)
In proposition 2, (14) is obtained by spatial derivation of (7) with the
envelop theorem, while (13) is obtained by spatial derivation of the combi-
nation of (6) and (10). (14) relates rstly that, at a given risk of natural
hazard, the land unit price pl(x) decreases while translating further away
from the city center, as rst explained by Alonso (1964). (14) tells sec-
ondly that, at a given distance to the city center, the land unit price pl(x)
decreases while translating towards riskier areas if insurance is not fully sub-
sidized ( < 1). Moreover, the higher the insurance subsidization (), the
lower the land price dierence between risky areas and safe areas. These
observations conrm the results of Frame (1998), Polinsky & Shavell (1976)
and Scawthorn et al. (1982) in a context including building resilience. (13)
indicates that the housing unit price ph(x) is modied through three chan-
nels while moving in the city: the land unit price pl(x), the housing lot size
s(x) and the building resilience b(x). At a given risk of natural hazard, the
housing unit price ph(x) decreases while translating further away from the
city center because rstly the land unit price decreases, secondly the eect
through the housing lot size is negative (because ds=d
!
x  0 and with the
reasonable assumption c(s;b)s  @c@s(s; b)) and thirdly the eect through the
building resilience is null. At a given distance to the city center, translat-
ing towards riskier areas leads to the decrease of housing unit price ph(x)
through the decrease of land unit price pl(x) and the increase of housing
lot size s(x) (as far as c(s;b)s  @c@s(s; b)), while on the other hand it leads
to the increase of housing unit price ph(x) through the increase of building
resilience b(x). This dierentiates slightly the spatial variation of land unit
price pl(x) and housing unit price ph(x), contrary to the previously cited pa-
pers which do not consider building resilience. Moreover, it is coherent with
the empirical observation by McKenzie & Levendis (2010) that investments
in building resilience increase housing prices.
Proposition 3 If the probability of natural hazard is denoted (t) on the
city boundaries, (t) is such that:
d
dt
=   1
(1  )l(s(x); b(x)) : (15)
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t

(t) (with aordable building resilience)
(t) (with unaordable building resilience)
Developed
Figure 3: City boundaries and developed areas, as a function of transport
cost t and probability  of natural hazard.
Proposition 3 is directly deduced from (14) because the land unit price
pl(x) is constant and equal to the opportunity rent pa on the city bound-
aries. (15) expresses that riskier locations are developed near the city center
because of lower transport cost, which conrms the result of Frame (1998)
in a context including building resilience. A location x at a distance t from
the city center is developed if (x)  (t). The outer boundary of the city
corresponds to the developed area the furthest away from the city center.
The inner boundaries of the city correspond to the riskiest developed area
for each distance to the city center. Figure 3 illustrates on a graph, with
transport and risk as coordinates, the city boundaries and the developed
areas. The slope of  relative to t is steeper when building resilience is
implemented. Thus, more households are located near the city center (i.e.
the city is more compact) when building resilience is more aordable.
4 The impact of insurance subsidization
Proposition 4 With actuarially fair insurance ( = 0), the allocation of
resources is Pareto optimal.
Proposition 4 is proved in appendix B.1. Actuarially fair insurance pol-
icy leads to the Pareto optimal allocation of resources because it gives the
right incentives to households and housing developers in terms of density
development and building resilience. In practice, actuarially fair insurance
14
is hardly ever implemented, and policy makers usually implement insurance
subsidy.
Proposition 5 With null cross derivation for l(:) and c(:) relative to their
two arguments, the increase of insurance subsidization has the following im-
pact on urban development at each location x of the city:
s(x)A1(x)
ds(x)
d
= (x)s(x)

@l
@s
(s(x); b(x))  l(s(x); b(x))
s(x)

+ (x)
dv
d
+
d
d
;
(16)
A2(x)
db(x)
d
= (x)
@l
@b
(s(x); b(x)); (17)
in which (x) = @~z@v (s(x); v)   s(x) @
2~z
@v@s(s(x); v) and A1(x) and A2(x) are
positive.
Proposition 5 is proved in appendix B.2. (16) characterizes how the
increase of insurance subsidy () aects the housing lot size s(x) and thus
the household density n(x) at each location in the city. The direct impact
corresponds to the rst term on the right-hand side of (16), which is negative
with the reasonable assumption l(s;b)s  @l@s(s; b) for any s and b. A given
increase of  gives, through this direct eect, a density increase which is
proportional to the probability (x). The indirect impact through the levels
of welfare v and tax  corresponds to the second and third terms. If the
number N of households is xed (which characterizes a "closed city" with
v endogenously determined), the density cannot increase everywhere in the
city12 and the increase of insurance subsidy reallocates households from safer
areas to riskier areas because of the direct eect. If the welfare level v is
xed (which characterizes an "open city" with N endogenously determined),
v is not aected by an increase of  while the impact on  depends on who
bears the cost of insurance subsidization. If the households in the city bear
this cost through the lump-sum tax  = N
RR
(x)l
 
s(x); b(x)

n(x)dx1dx2,
an increase of  due to an increase of  makes the city less attractive,
which explains why it increases lot sizes and decreases densities. Thus,
in this case, the increase of insurance subsidy leads to a density increase
in strongly risky areas and a density decrease in weakly risky areas. If
the households in the city do not bear the cost of insurance subsidization
12With N xed, the population constraint (3) gives 0 =
RR
1
s(x)2
ds(x)
d
dx1dx2, which
means that ds(x)
d
cannot be negative at all locations. Thus, (x) dv
d
+ d
d
in (16) cannot
be negative for all the location in the city.
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(i.e.  = 0), an increase of  does not have this negative eect on the
city attractiveness. Thus, in this case, the increase of insurance subsidy
leads to a general density increase in the city. These results explain in
which direction density policies should be enforced in risk-prone cities when
insurance subsidy is implemented. Besides, (17) points out how the increase
of insurance subsidy () modies the building resilience b(x) at each location
in the city. The impact is negative and proportional to the local probability
(x). A given increase of  leads to a higher building resilience decrease in
risky areas than in safe areas. As a consequence, whether with a closed city
or an open city and whoever subsidizes insurance, the increase of insurance
subsidy leads to a general decrease in building resilience in the city. Note
that this decrease is null if the building resilience is already binding in zero
(which is the case at a risk-free location). These results show that resilience
policies should be enforced when insurance subsidy is implemented.
Proposition 6 The increase of insurance subsidization has the following
impact on housing and land prices at each location x in the city:
dph(x)
d
=
dpl(x)
d
+
@c
@s
(s(x); b(x))  c(s(x);b(x))
s(x)
s(x)
ds(x)
d
+
@c
@b
(s(x); b(x))
s(x)
db(x)
d
; (18)
dpl(x)
d
=
1
s(x)

(x)l(s(x); b(x))  (x) dv
d
  d
d

; (19)
in which (x) = @~z@v
 
s(x); v

is positive.
In proposition 6, (19) is obtained at a given location by derivation of
(7) relative to  with the envelop theorem, while (18) is obtained at a given
location by derivation of the combination of (6) and (10) relative to .
(19) relates how the increase of insurance subsidy () aects the land price
pl(x) at each location in the city. The direct impact corresponds to the
rst term on the right-hand side which is positive and proportional to the
local probability (x). For a given increase of , the riskier the location,
the higher the land price increase through this direct eect. The indirect
impact through the levels of welfare v and tax  corresponds to the second
and third terms. If the welfare level v is xed (which characterizes an "open
city" with N endogenously determined), v is not aected by an increase
of  while the impact on  depends on who bears the cost of insurance
subsidization. If the households in the city bear this cost through the lump-
sum tax  = N
RR
(x)l
 
s(x); b(x)

n(x)dx1dx2, an increase of  due to an
increase of  decreases their wealth and thus land prices. Thus, in this case,
16
.
t

(t)
(t) (with subsidy increase from the city)
(t) (with subsidy increase from outside the city)
Developed
Figure 4: City boundaries and developed areas, as a function of transport
cost t and probability  of natural hazard.
the increase of insurance subsidy leads to a land price increase in strongly
risky areas and a land price decrease in weakly risky areas. If the households
in the city do not bear the cost of insurance subsidization (i.e.  = 0), an
increase of  does not have this negative eect on land prices. Thus, in
this case, the increase of insurance subsidy leads to a general land price
increase in the city because the increase of attractiveness of the city is not
lowered by a tax on households in the city. Figure 4 illustrates the impact
of a subsidy increase on the city boundaries for an "open city" in the case
where the subsidy is borne by households in the city and in the case where
the subsidy is not borne by households in the city. Besides, (18) states that
the housing price ph(x) is modied through three channels while increasing
insurance subsidy (): the land unit price pl(x), the housing lot size s(x)
and the building resilience b(x). The direction of the impacts through the
land unit price and the housing lot size depends on the location, similarly
to these two variables. The impact through the building resilience decreases
the housing unit price because the increase of insurance subsidy decreases
the building resilience and thus its cost.
5 Conclusion
The paper has analyzed urban development choices in a city prone to natural
disasters. It complements previous studies, in particular by including build-
ing resilience choices. Riskier areas are developed nearer to the city center
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than further away. Investment in building resilience leads to more compact
cities. At a given distance to the city center, riskier areas have lower land
prices and get lower household density and higher building resilience if in-
surance is not fully subsidized. Actuarially fair insurance leads households
to optimally settle in space in terms of density and resilience. An increase of
insurance subsidization leads to an increase of density in the riskiest areas
of the city, in particular displacing inner boundaries towards riskier areas
near the city center. Moreover an increase of insurance subsidization leads
to a general decrease of building resilience in the city. To avoid excessive
exposure to risk in the case of insurance subsidization, policy makers have
to complement their policies by enforcing density and zoning restrictions as
well as building codes. In this perspective, the present paper tells that, in
the case of insurance subsidization, density and zoning restrictions have to
be enforced at least in the riskiest areas of the city, in particular near the
city center where land is attractive because of low transport costs. It also
tells that, in the case of insurance subsidization, building codes should be
generally enforced in the city for Pareto improvement.
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A Risk-prone city development
A.1 Characteristics of ~z(:)
The derivation of v(~z(s; v); s) = v relative to s gives:
@v
@z
@~z
@s
+
@v
@s
= 0; (20)
which can be rewritten:
@~z
@s
=  @sv
@zv
: (21)
Because v(:) is increasing with z and s, ~z(:) is decreasing with s. Besides,
the derivation of (20) relative to s gives:
@2v
@z2

@~z
@s
2
+
@v
@z
@2~z
@s2
+ 2
@2v
@z@s
@~z
@s
+
@2v
@s2
= 0; (22)
which can be rewritten with (21):
@v
@z
@2~z
@s2
=  @
2v
@z2

@sv
@zv
2
+ 2
@2v
@z@s
@sv
@zv
  @
2v
@s2
: (23)
The term on the right-hand side of (23) is positive because v(:) is concave
and the determinant of the Hessian matrix of v(:) is positive. Thus, @
2~z
@s2
is
positive and ~z(:) is decreasing with s at a decreasing rate.
A.2 Derivation of (8) and (9)
With (21) and the expression (7) of pl(x), the rst order conditions of (7)
relative to s(x) and b(x) are respectively:
@sv
@zv
 
s(x); ~z(s(x); v)

  (1  )(x) @l@s
 
s(x); b(x)

  @c@s
 
s(x); b(x)

s(x)
  pl(x)
s(x)
= 0;
(24)
 (1  )(x) @l
@b
 
s(x); b(x)

  @c
@b
 
s(x); b(x)

= 0; (25)
which respectively give (8) and (9).
A.3 Proof of proposition 1
As the rst order conditions of (7) correspond to a maximum, the second
order conditions of (7) are negative at the solutions s(x) and b(x). Thus,
the following expressions which are called A1(x) and A2(x) are positive:
A1(x) =
@2~z
@s2
 
s(x); v

+ (1  )(x) @
2l
@s2
 
s(x); b(x)

+
@2c
@s2
 
s(x); b(x)

 0; (26)
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A2(x) = (1  )(x) @
2l
@b2
 
s(x); b(x)

+
@2c
@b2
 
s(x); b(x)

 0: (27)
With null cross derivation for l(:) and c(:) relative to their two arguments,
the spatial derivation of (8) and (9) respectively gives:
A1(x)
ds
d
!
x
=
1
s(x)
dt
d
!
x
+ (1  )

l
 
s(x); b(x)

s(x)
  @l
@s
 
s(x); b(x)
 d
d
!
x
; (28)
A2(x)
db
d
!
x
=  (1  ) @l
@b
 
s(x); b(x)
 d
d
!
x
; (29)
which gives proposition 1.
B The impact of insurance subsidization
B.1 Optimal allocation
The rst welfare theorem predicts the Pareto optimality with  = 0 because
ecient insurance markets would lead to actuarially fair insurance. For the
formal proof, the optimal allocation with uniform welfare level v is obtained
by minimizing the total expenditure of the city with N households:
min
s(:);b(:);n(:)
ZZ 
~z
 
s(x); v

+ t(x) + (x)l
 
s(x); b(x)

+ c
 
s(x); b(x)

n(x)dx1dx2
s.t. n(x)s(x)  1; 8x
N =
ZZ
n(x)dx1dx2:
(30)
The rst order conditions give similar equations to the decentralized econ-
omy with  = 0. Thus, the actuarially fair insurance policy (i.e. with  = 0)
implements the Pareto optimal allocation of resources.
B.2 Proof of proposition 5
The proof of proposition 5 is similar to the proof of proposition 1. The pos-
itive A1(x) and A2(x) are dened by (26) and (27). Contrary to proposition
1, the derivation of (8) and (9) relative to  at a given location x do not
have terms with derivatives of t(x) and (x) but have terms with derivatives
of v and  . With null cross derivation for l(:) and c(:) relative to their two
arguments, the derivation of (8) and (9) relative to  at a given location x
respectively gives:
s(x)A1(x)
ds(x)
d
= (x)s(x)

@l
@s
(s(x); b(x))  l(s(x); b(x))
s(x)

+ (x)
dv
d
+
d
d
;
(31)
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A2(x)
db(x)
d
= (x)
@l
@b
(s(x); b(x)); (32)
in which (x) = @~z@v (s(x); v)  s(x) @
2~z
@v@s(s(x); v). This gives proposition 5.
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